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ESSAY

No Tourists
By Edward James

R r a number of years, the College has
had a "Non-Western General Education
Requirement," and, in response to that requirement, I have developed and taught
two courses-Philosophies of India and
Philosophies of China and Japan. I have
never been to India, China, or Japan;
probably never will visit those countries;
and cannot speak or read Sanskrit,
Chinese, Japanese. While I have taken
courses in Indian thought from an internationally recognized Indian scholar and
keep up with the literature in major journals and the like, I have no plans to contribute to the scholarship of Asian studies.
So, how can I possibly justify teaching
these courses? Isn't this lack of specialization just what is wrong with college education, where standards are lost in a
smorgasbord of offerings?
What gives this question its sting is that
I believe and so readily grant that one
should not teach a philosophy course
unless one is creatively involved in
research in key areas of that course. I
don't believe that it is enough that one be
merely "intrigued" by a subject in order to
teach it. For teaching philosophy is not so
much a matter of imparting information as
it is engaging in a quest-a quest to
understand, and so actively do research
in, some important areas of human life.
And so if I myself am not engaged in that
quest, if I am simply reporting on the
quests and research of others, that Confuius said this and Sankara that, then all I
am doing is being a tourist. And what I am
then teaching is a history of crazy ideas, a
visit to odd and strange places, which one
leaves with a shower and a guffaw. Clearly,
the "subtext" of any such course, what remains unstated but deeply instilled, is that
these other ideas and cultures are not fundamental and thus to be engaged, but are
superficial and thus to be looked at as at
best "weird" and at worst boring.
To be a tourist in philosophy is to be
justifiably damned. The non-apocryphal
story goes that the American philosopher
Ernest Nagel, while visiting in England,

knocked on the door of Witlgenstein, one
of the few great philosophers of the century, aiming to participate for an evening
in the Great Man's. "at-home." Witlgenstein opened the door to Nagel, heard his
request, and then slammed the door shut,
uttering as he did so, "No tourists": no
dilettantes, no visitors, no gawkers, no
"Gee whiz, will'ya look at that getup!" And
I believe, deeply, that this attitude is right.
For to teach philosophy is to do philosophy. It is not to visit but to build. So,
what right do I have to teach these
courses?" Am I not a tourist in the area?
To escape the charge of tourism I need,
first, to distinguish between doing
research in the ideas of a culture and
doing research in philosophy. On the one
hand, researching a culture's ideas involves doing such things as (i) delving into
the etymology of a term-e.g., that "karma" designates an action, a performance;
(ii) tracing the development of an
idea-e.g., that the idea of karma began
as a magic-minded ritual, either to keep
the cosmos in order or to advance one's
own interests, and gradually evolved to
the notion of liberating oneself from fear
and hate; (III) interconnecting such ideas
with other ideas, e.g., that to liberate
oneself is to free oneself from the attachment to one's desires which in turn chain
one to the circle of births and rebirths,
samsara; (iv) inter-connecting this set of
ideas with the practices of a culture, e.g.,
that the ideas nested in karma are seen as
justifying the class and caste system in Indian culture-that each self is born into a
situation which it deserves because of its
actions in former lives; and so on. On the
other hand, doing research in philosophy
involves asking whether or not the ideas
of a thinker or culture are true or justifiable. One asks: Is it the case that we live
a life that is best seen in terms of karma,
samsara, and reincarnation? Is it the case
that the situation in which we find ourselves-as poor or wealthy, sick or
healthy-should be seen in terms of the
fruits of past actions, even past actions in
other lives? Is it the case that we should
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seek to liberate ourselves from fear and
hate by detaching ourselves from our
commitments and desires? And so on.
So, what I teach and do research in as a
philosoher is the theory of justification-to look at reason-giving and to
determine the "logic" of giving reasons.
To do this it is not necessary to become
an expert in a culture's ideas. It is enough
to rely on the experts to come up with a
reasonable interpretation of how reasoning works in that culture and then to carry
on the discussion by asking whether these
reasons are defensible. Accordingly, one
of the foremost interpreters of Aristotle is
the thirteenth century thinker, Thomas
Aquinas, who knew no Greek and even
less of Greek culture and saw Aristotle
through the eyes of the Muslim Averroes.
But what Aquinas did know was that the
questions, reasons, and theories found in
Aristotle's works reflected perennial concerns of human life. And he also knew
that these questions, reasons, and
theories could best be understood by
engaging them in critical discussion.
To review, I started out by asking how I
could legitimately teach an area like Asian
thought. And in trying to answer that
question, I have raised another and more
difficult question: How is it that we can
evaluate the ideas-like karma and reincarnation and samsara-of another culture? They are so alien!
One reply that at least some are inclined
to give to this question is that we should
dismiss Indian thought and its like just
because they are so alien to our own way
of thinking. This is the way of militant
monism, the view that there is one true
view, and that we have it. And so in
response to other cultures we adopt the
way of the missionary who comes to convert the heathen.
While it would be quick and thus
tempting to say that another perspective is
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alien and so false, militant monism fails on
at least three counts. First, to dismiss
another point of view just because it is
alien, strange weird, or absurd, is logically
defective: it is inherently circular. For all
such dismissals do is say that this is not
our view. But as we well know, it hardly
follows that because something is different, even very different, from our own
view, that it is false. Second, these hasty
dismissals of other perspectives are heuristically defective: they prevent progress in
knowledge. For all the views which we
hold and cherish today-whether religious, scientific, or political-are views
which once were judged alien. In the
world of ideas all ideas are immigrants.
Finally, these hasty dismissals are morally
defective: they express a profound
disrespect of other persons. For one
essential way that we take other persons
seriously is to grant that what they say
may be true. Hence to dismiss another
point of view just because it is different is
to say, right at the start, that those who
espouse this point of view are not worthy
of respect.
Moved by this rejection of militant
monism, many proceed to insist that no
one should judge the views of another
culture. We have our views. They have
theirs. And it is part of showing them
respect that we do not try to foist our "intrinsically better" ideas on them. Rather,
much as an explorer comes to marvel at
the works and ways of another land, we
should learn to appreciate the internal
logic of these other views and leave it at
that. This is the way of cultural relativism,
the view that truth is internal to a given
culture because the criteria of truth, the
standards by which we appraise a given
claim or set of claims, arise out of the
needs and interests of the culture. Hence,
the relativist would conclude, any criticism
of one culture by another of necessity
must be circular: it must assume what it
wants to show. For to criticize is to appeal
to standards-to show that certain standards have not been met. But when we
criticize one culture by appealing to the
standards of our own culture, all we are
doing is stating what we knew all along,
that the standards of our culture differ
from the standards of those other cultures

cultures we are "criticizing."
There is much to be said for this sort of
cultural relativism. Above all, it practices a
praiseworthy cosmopolitan urbanity in its
celebration of human variegation-crucial
to a world growing increasingly smaller
and more interconnected. Moreover, its
understanding of reasoning-that we
reason from a perspective, that this perspective reflects a culture-is a crucial insight into human inquiry. Still, cultural
relativism fares no better than does militant monism.
First, like militant monism, cultural
relativism is logically defective: it is selfrefuting. For its central claim that standards are relative to a culture is itself intended to be a non-relative or absolute
claim about standards. Thus, relativism is
a non-relative (and so self-refuting) claim.
Second, like militant monism, cultural
relativism is heuristically defective: it, too,
obstructs the advance of knowledge. For if
truth is what a given culture decides, then
there is no motivation for the dominant
classes of the culture to find out "the
truth." They already have it. So, for instance, they will not worry about whether
their social practices are justified. The fact
that the practices are theirs, by the
reasoning of cultural relativism, automatically justifies them. Any further questioning would only disrupt social stability.
Finally, like militant monism, cultural
relativism is morally defective: it does not
entail a cosmopolitan urbanity. For all
cultural relativism states is a theory of
justification-that one's standards are internal to one's culture. This theory
discourages a live-and-let-Iive attitude,
particularly in cultures' whose standards
are closed and even hostile to the ideas of
other cultures. In fact, cultural relativism
in general entails cultural intolerance;
consider, for example, Nazism, all fundamentalisms, Maoism, all nationalisms.
Most of the world's people live under one
or another of these ideologies and are,
then, by culture intolerant. Further, even
supposing we did live in a culture that is
cosmopolitan, by the lights of cultural
relativism we could adopt no adequate
stance to confront the deeply entrenched
intolerance, racism, sexism, and genocide
of other cultures. Cosmopolitan relativists
13

can say that they do not share such beliefs
but they have no reason to condemn
them. So Munich is repeated.
In sum, relativism is a form of tourism.
It looks at a perspective and, commendably, tries to understand the perspective
on its own terms, but them, condemnably,
leaves it at that. It takes its admirable
refusal to follow militant monism and condemn whatever is different to mean that
nothing, even great evils, should be condemned. In doing so relativism ironically
proves to be as condescending in its own
way as militant monism. For relativism
fails to see that to respect other perspectives and persons is not simply to understand them but to engage them in critical
dialogue, where dialogue grants that there
may be something both to teach and to
learn. Indeed, to take other persons and
cultures seriously is to grant with relativism that they have their own integrity
and strengths-and thus may have much
to teach us; and with monism that we have
our own integrity and strengths-and
thus may have something to teach them.
In considering other cultures, in short,
what we have first and foremost to rely on
is the guide of the full-blooded conversation as found in cooperative inquiry. This
guide itself is a gift from many traditions: a
gift of ancient democratic Greece-especially of Pericles, Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle-and of the European Renaissance-especially of Bacon, Galileo,
Locke, and Newton. As such it is part of
"our" culture, "our" overall perspective,
and so, of course, can and should be
challenged. But one way it can't be challenged is by inquiring whether it, inquiring conversation, is a proper practice. For
to challenge it in that sense is not to
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challenge it at all but to assume it. Nor
can it be challenged by forcibly stamping
it out-as found in some evangelical and
imperialistic monisms. While this no
doubt poses a threat to the practice of inquiring conversation, it does not challenge its rationality. Nor again can it be
challenged by the relativistic claim that no
practice is objectively better than any
other. For this claim is self-refuting; it is
the absolutistic claim that no claim is absolutistic. Rather, the practice of inquiring
conversation can be challenged only by
determining whether or not it provides
the most complete and coherent set of
ideals for living a human life. Is there
another guide, another practical source of
ideals, which offers as much as the practice of inquiring conversation does about
living a good life?
It is in this way, for instance, that I
argued for the superiority of the practice
of the inquiring conversation over both
militant monism and cultural relativism.
The practice of the inquiring conversation
suggests what is important in militant
monism, that there are real wrongs to
fight, and what is important in cultural
relativism, that there are many good ways
to live a life, without falling into the traps
of militant monism's imperialism or of
cultural relativism's spinelessness. In this
way the ideals supportive of the practice of
inquiring conversation can be seen as
more inclusive and coherent than those
supportive of the practices of militant
monism and cultural relativism. Further,
we can see that the ideals suggested by the
inquiring conversation surpass by embracing the ideal of tolerance. For the ideal of
tolerance not only is condescendingsuggesting that the superior view will
deign to allow the inferior to exist-but
also is morally spineless, seeming to call
for tolerance of the intolerant. Instead of
tolerance the practice of the inquiring
conversation calls for the celebration of
the ideals that emerge out of cooperative
inquiry. This pluralistic celebration
recognizes that these ideals will often have
different emphases and so will compete
with each other, but that we need all of
them to express ways of life that cannot be
exhaustively presented by anyone set of
ideals.

Our ideals, in other words, are not initially obvious in the way we live. Rather,
like electrons and other intellectual constructs, they are only potentially present
in our lives. They lie implicit in our everyday practices and so have to be drawn out
and made actual by our articulating them,
as we use them to help us make more
sense of what is best in our lives. Thus, for
instance, we may and do challenge
whether a particular account of the inquiring conversation is the most complete and
coherent one available, or whether inquiring conversation is itself an incomplete
practice that needs to be embraced by
some practice that gives rise to more inclusive ideals. Ideals are thus both
discoveries and inventions: discoveries, in
that not any concept will suffice to make
sense of the best of life; but inventions, in
that many concepts will suffice to make
sense of a good life.
One image that helps to unfold the
practice of the inquiring conversation is
the well-known Indian story of the blind
persons who met an elephant. One felt the
elephant's side and said that the elephant
was a wall; another felt the elephant's tusk
and declared that the elephant was a
spear; another the elephant's underbelly
and judged that the elephant was a roof;
and another the elephant's legs and concluded that the elephant was a grove of
trees. The story concludes that each was
right in what each specifically said and was
wrong only in claiming to have the whole
truth. In doing so the story teaches the
paradox that while truth can be arrived at
only by all inquirers listening to each
other, we can come to truth only through
the specific language that we ourselves
speak. For it is only by speaking a
language, seeing the elephant this way
rather than that, that we have something
clear to criticize, discuss, surpass. As
Francis Bacon remarked, the truth is
more likely to emerge from a clearly
presented claim, however wrong, than
from a vague and obscure notion, however
well intended.
In summary, it is a central task of the
College to help students to work through
the paradox of the blind persons and the
elephant-that truth depends on many
languages but can at first only be ap-
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proached through one's own. By trusting
their languages and practices without
peremptorily dismissing the languages
and practices of others, they can come to
learn that they need other languages to
escape their culture's limitations and
simplistic recipes of life and to gain some
semblance of the whole truth. Moreover,
by being raised out of their culture's narrow perspective into a more encompassing
and world-wide view, they can attain a
more deeply embedded commitment to
their culture's truths. For they thereby
come to see, with a confident appreciation
that can only be based on honest inquiry,
what the truths of their culture are. They
have learned to reject both the easy
answers of the "How To" book of the
culture and the despair that so often
follows when the given recipes have failed.
Such thinkers at once energize a culture,
invigorating it with new ideals and
possibilities, and also undermine the
unexamined and studied simplicities of
that culture's life. Hence they are often
regarded as a mixed blessing by the more
entrenched powers of the culture. Yet
they alone remain open to and aware of
the ambiguities of life and of the complexities of issues, and at the same time
shrewdly hopeful of the possibilities of
cooperative inquiry over time to address
these challenges. Such, then, is a central
aim of the General Education Requirements, especially as exemplified by the
Non-Western requirement, and it makes
me glad to be a part of it-engaging
students in research in the theories of
justification found in non-Western works.

Edward James,
Professor of Philosophy

